The Lebanese Civil War of 1975 |
Between the years 1975 and 1992, a most devastating armed conflict took place in Lebanon. This war was one of the most devastating wars in recent memory. Some 150,000 persons died, as many were seriously injured. The physical destruction alone was estimated by International Organizations at $25 to $30 billion which constituted close to 13 times the national income of the country at the end of the war.The war was largely the result of tensions between religious groups, worsened by the influx of Palestinians. Each group in Lebanon has its own soldiers.To many Lebanese, the complex 1975 Civil War can be summarized in only a few words. These words are place-names, such as Ad Damur or Karantina, which evoke traumatic memories of massacres and atrocities and need no further explanation. A narrative of the Civil War is therefore more a translation of this vocabulary of suffering and pain than a chronology of campaigns.
~Start of conflict~
The Cairo Agreement and the Prelude to the 1975 Civil War
...The Lebanese army's inactivity
continued under Shihab's successor, Charles Hilu , who became
president in 1964. Hilu and his army commander refused to commit
Lebanese troops to the June 1967 War, enraging many Lebanese
Muslims. In the aftermath of that war, the army and its Deuxième
Bureau turned a blind eye to Palestinian guerrillas infiltrating
Lebanon from Syria and other Arab countries , an attitude that
angered Christians. But when the army did not interfere with
commando raids and the Israelis launched attacks into Lebanon in
retaliation against the Palestinian forces, the army and the
Deuxiéme Bureau were charged with collusion with Israel. In
December 1968, the government was humiliated when Israeli
commandos landed at Beirut International Airport and destroyed
Middle East Airlines aircraft with impunity. In October 1969, the
Lebanese Army took a more active role in fighting Palestinian
forces. Nevertheless, it was clear that the army could decisively
defeat the Palestinians only at the risk of splitting the nation.
Therefore, army commander General Emil Bustani signed the Cairo
Agreement in November 1969 with Palestinian representatives .
The Cairo Agreement remains officially secret, but it apparently
granted to the Palestinians the right to keep weapons in their
camps and to attack Israel across Lebanon's border. By
sanctioning the armed Palestinian presence, however, Lebanon
surrendered full sovereignty over military operations conducted
within and across its borders and became a party to the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
A turning point in Lebanon's modern history occurred in 1970. In
that year, Sulayman Franjiyeh was elected president. Franjiyeh,
came from the Christian enclave of Zgharta in northern Lebanon
was accused of not confronting Lebanon's growing security
problems. Believing that the Deuxième Bureau was staffed with
Shihab loyalists, Franjiyah purged it and stripped it of its
powers. But the Deuxième Bureau had been the only governmental
entity capable of monitoring and controlling the Palestinians,
and Franjiyah's action unintentionally gave the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) more freedom of action in Lebanon.
The PLO leadership and guerrillas moved their main base of
operations from Jordan to Lebanon, where the Cairo Agreement
endorsed their presence. The influx of several hundred thousand
Palestinians upset Lebanon's delicate confessional balance , and
polarized the nation into two camps--those who supported and
those who opposed the PLO presence. Public order deteriorated
with daily acts of violence between Christians and Palestinians.
Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force launched raids against the
Palestinian refugee camps in retaliation for PLO attacks in
Western Europe. On April 10, 1973, Israeli commandos infiltrated
Beirut in a daring raid and attacked Palestinian command centers
in the heart of the capital Beirut .Once again, the conspicuous
absence of the Lebanese Army during the Israeli attack angered
Lebanese Muslims. Prime Minister Saib Salam claimed that Army
commander General Iskandar Ghanim--a Maronite--had disobeyed
orders by not resisting the Israeli raid, and he threatened to
resign unless Ghanim were stripped of his rank. Because Ghanim
was allowed to remain as army commander (until he was replaced by
Hanna Said in September 1975), Salam did resign.
When the Lebanese Army finally went into action, it was against
the PLO. In May 1973, fierce combat raged around the refugee
camps for two weeks. When the dust settled, it became clear to
all Lebanese that their army was not strong enough to control the
PLO. To end the fighting, the government negotiated the Melkart
Agreement, which on the one hand obligated the PLO to respect the
"independence, stability, and sovereignty" of Lebanon
but on the other hard ceded to the PLO virtual autonomy,
including the right to maintain its own militia forces in certain
areas of Lebanon. These provisions of the Melkart Agreement
differed greatly from the Cairo Agreement, which preserved the
"exercise of full powers in all regions and in all
circumstances by Lebanese civilian and military
authorities."
Lebanese Muslims believed that under the Melkart Agreement
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon had been accorded a greater
degree of self-determination than some Lebanese citizens.
Inspired by this, they organized themselves politically and
militarily and tried to wrest similar concessions from the
central government. In 1974 Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt
established the Lebanese National Movement (formerly the Front
for Progressive Parties and National Forces), an umbrella group
comprising antigovernment forces.
The Military Cabinet
During the first months of intermittent combat between Muslims and Christians, President Franjiyeh refused to commit the army to separate the combatants. On May 23, however, he took the unorthodox and unprecedented step of appointing a military cabinet. Muslim Brigadier Nur ad Din Rifai, retired commander of the Internal Security Force, was named prime minister. Rifai selected the controversial Ghanim as his minister of defense; all other cabinet ministers except one were also military officers. Franjiyeh's motives were difficult to discern. Perhaps Franjiyeh sincerely thought that a strong interconfessional military government with unquestionable authority over the army could avert widespread conflict, although Lebanon's democracy would be sacrificed. Indeed, Syrian foreign minister Abdal HalimKhaddam reportedly warned Lebanese politicians that the Lebanese Army was capable of uniting its ranks, staging a coup d'état, and imposing a military dictatorship. Nevertheless, Lebanon's first and last military government was short lived, resigning two days after its inception. Even when installed in the government, the army proved unwilling or incapable of exerting authority in Lebanon. The resignation of the military government demonstrated the power vacuum in Lebanese politics and served as the catalyst to conflict. The rival military factions intensified their fighting, and full-fledged civil war began in earnest.
First Combats
The Lebanese Civil War started on
April 13, 1975, when unidentified gunmen opened fire at a
congregation outside a Maronite church in Ayn ar Rummanaha,
Christian suburb of Beirut . In apparent retaliation, members of
the Christian Phalange Party ambushed a bus filled with
Palestinians and shot the passengers. These events initiated the
escalating cycle of retaliation and revenge that came to
characterize Lebanon for the next decade.
The first six months of combat were desultory by subsequent
Lebanese standards, with Phalangist and Palestinian forces
exchanging small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire from
their respective strongholds of Al Ashrafiyah and Tall Zatar. The
Phalangist strategy was predicated on forcing the army to
intervene on its side. Although over 1,000 people were killed in
the early fighting, many Lebanese still viewed the nascent Civil
War as a transitory phenomenon that would soon abate, like past
security crises. Therefore, when well-organized Muslim militias
attacked the downtown Qantari district in late October 1975,
causing heavy loss of life and massive property damage, many
inhabitants of Beirut realized for the first time that the war
was a serious affair. The Muslim side eventually took Qantari and
occupied the forty-story Murr Tower, the highest building in
Beirut.
On December 6, 1975, "Black Saturday," Phalangists set
up roadblocks on city streets, seized an estimated 350 Muslims,
and murdered them. Muslims had been easily identifiable because
Lebanese identification cards indicated religious affiliation.
This was the first major massacre of civilians in the Civil War
and started a vicious cycle of revenge and retaliation. From this
point on, after combatants of each faction conquered territory
from their rivals, they routinely killed civilians.
In late 1975 and early 1976, fierce fighting engulfed Beirut's
high-rise hotel district. The hotels changed hands several times,
with the Muslims ultimately securing control of the area. The
expanded scope and intensity of the combat increased casualties
greatly, with over 1,000 killed in the first weeks of the new
year.
It was at this juncture that the Lebanese Army disintegrated
completely. On January 16, 1976, Minister of Defense Shamun
called in the mostly Christian-manned Lebanese Air Force to bomb
leftist positions in Ad Damur. In response, Muslim troops rallied
to the side of Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib, who split off and
declared the creation of the Lebanese Arab Army . In desperation,
Beirut garrison commander Brigadier Aziz Ahdab seized Beirut's
radio and television stations on March 11 and announced that the
Lebanese Army was stepping in to take over the government and
restore order. But Ahdab's move came too late, and he was
derisively nicknamed "General Television" by militia
leaders, who commanded far more men. Karantina, a slum district
named after the old immigration quarantine area, was the site of
the next major episode in the war. Situated so that it controlled
Christian access over the Beirut River bridge to the strategic
port area, it became a military target. Karantina was populated
primarily by poor Kurds and Armenians but was controlled by a PLO
detachment. On January 18, 1976, Christian forces conquered
Karantina and up to 1,000 civilians were killed. Two days later,
revenge-seeking Palestinians and leftist Muslims attacked the
Christian city of Ad Damur, located about 20 kilometers south of
Beirut, and murdered between 200 and 500 Christians. The two
consecutive massacres induced Muslims residing in
Christian-dominated areas to flee to Muslim-held areas, and vice
versa. Whereas most Lebanese towns and neighborhoods previously
had been integrated, for the first time large-scale population
transfers began to divide the country into segregated zones, the
first step toward de facto partition.
The Christians were losing the Civil War as the Muslim-leftist
side forced them to retreat farther into East Beirut. The
Christians felt it imperative to retain control of Beirut's port
district and constructed an elaborate barricade defense at
Allenby Street. In May 1976, as the Christians tried to stave off
the Muslim assault on the port district, the Lebanese Army
finally
entered the fray. Christian officers and enlisted men from the Al
Fayadiyyah barracks outside Beirut came to the aid of their
beleaguered coreligionists, bringing armored cars and heavy
artillery. The Muslim advance was stopped, and the front at
Allenby Street evolved into a no-man's-land, dividing Christian
East Beirut from Muslim West Beirut. Vegetation that
eventually grew in this abandoned area inspired the name Green
Line , and the Green Line remained till the End Of The War .
Regional Intervention
The government of Syria, although
in theory a socialist regime, feared that a leftist victory and
the installation of a radical government in Lebanon would
undermine Syrian security and provide Israel an excuse to
intervene in the area. After repeated diplomatic efforts failed
to quell the Lebanese Civil War, on June 1, 1976, Syria
intervened on the side of the Christians. In the following
months, the Syrian presence grew to 27,000 troops. By November
the Syrians had occupied most Muslim-held areas of Lebanon,
including West Beirut and Tripoli. Most Muslim forces capitulated
without firing a shot, overwhelmed by the Syrian show of force.
In Sidon, however, Palestinian and leftist forces fought off the
Syrians for nearly six months before relinquishing their
stronghold.
For nearly the entire first year of the Civil War, the
Phalangists and the PLO had made a mutual attempt to avoid
combat, even as smaller Christian and Palestinian splinter groups
clashed. The PLO tried to enhance its reputation and credibility
by playing the role of a neutral mediator between the Lebanese
left and the Christians. For its part, the Phalange Party avoided
antagonizing the PLO because it feared that the Palestinians
would intervene on the Muslim side. After Syria had subdued the
Muslim threat, however, the Phalangists turned their full
attention to the Palestinians.
The battle for Tall Zatar was the final showdown of the Lebanese
Civil War. Tall Zatar was a Palestinian refugee camp situated on
the Christian side of the Green Line where about 1,500
Palestinian guerrillas defended a civilian population of roughly
20,000 against several thousand Christian militiamen. The
Christians were supported and advised in their siege by the
Lebanese and Syrian armies; Israeli advisers were also present on
the Christian side.
Because Tall Zatar was honeycombed with bunkers and tunnels, the
PLO was able to defend the camp from persistent Christian attacks
for about six months, despite a nearly constant barrage of
artillery fire that took a large toll. On August 12 Christian
forces finally overran the camp and many of the several thousand
civilians who had remained there were killed.
The Arab deterrent Forces (a.k.a Riyadh conference)
In October 1976 a League of Arab
States (Arab League) summit conference was convened in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, to resolve the Lebanese crisis. The conference did
not address the underlying political and demographic problems,
only the security situation. The resulting multilateral agreement
mandated a cease-fire and, at the Lebanese government's behest,
authorized the creation of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to
impose and supervise the cease-fire. In theory the ADF, funded by
the Arab League, was to be a pan-Arab peacekeeping force under
the supreme command of the Lebanese president. In reality, only
about 5,000 Arab troops from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf
states, Libya, and Sudan augmented the existing
Syrian forces. Moreover, Syria would not relinquish actual
command over its soldiers. Therefore, the agreement in effect
legitimized and subsidized the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. In
the summer of 1977 Syria, the PLO, and the government of Lebanon
signed the Shtawrah Accord, which detailed the planned
disposition of the ADF in Lebanon and called for a reconstituted
Lebanese Army to take over PLO positions in southern Lebanon.
The Red Line
Meanwhile, Israel grew concerned
over the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, particularly as the
Syrian Army pursued retreating Palestinians and Muslim leftists
into southern Lebanon. Israel believed that the Syrian forces,
massed in southern Lebanon, might attack Israel across the
unfortified Lebanese border and thus avoid the need to penetrate
the heavily defended
Golan Heights. Therefore, Israel enunciated its "Red
Line" policy, threatening to attack Syria if it crossed a
line identified geographically with the Litani River . Thus,
Syrian forces were generally precluded from moving south of the
Litani. The Red Line was a geographic line, but it was also more
subjective than a line on a map. Israeli prime minister Yitzhak
Rabin identified the Red Line as a guideline for gauging Syria's
overall military behavior in Lebanon, and he described several
criteria Israel would use: the objectives of Syrian forces and
against whom they were operating, the geographical area and its
proximity to Israel's borders, the strength and composition of
Syrian forces, and the duration of their stay in a given area.
Operation Litani
Because it was skeptical about the
willingness and capability of the Lebanese Army to implement the
Shtawrah Accord by displacing the PLO in southern Lebanon and
securing the border area, in 1977 Israel started to equip and
fund a renegade Christian remnant of the Lebanese Army led by
Major Saad Haddad. Haddad's force, which became known as The Free
Lebanon Army, and later as the South Lebanon Army (SLA), grew to
a strength of about 3,000 men and was allied closely with Israel.
Haddad eventually proclaimed the enclave he controlled "Free
Lebanon." The insulation provided by this buffer area
permitted Israel to open up its border with Lebanon. Under this
so-called "Good Fence" policy, Israel provided aid and
conducted trade with Lebanese living near the border.
On March 11, 1978, PLO made a sea landing in Haifa, Israel,
commandeered a bus, and then drove toward Tel Aviv, firing from
the windows. By the end of the day, the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) had killed the nine attackers, who had murdered
thirty-seven Israeli civilians. In retaliation, four days later
Israel launched Operation Litani, invading Lebanon with a force
of 25,000 men. The purpose of the operation was to push PLO
positions away from the border and bolster the power of the SLA.
The IDF first seized a security belt about ten kilometers deep,
but then pushed north and captured all of Lebanon south of the
Litani River, inflicting thousands of casualties.
Bashir Jemayel Era
Emboldened by Israel's willingness
to intervene militarily in Lebanon, Bashir Jumayyil exploited
Israel's tacit guarantees to consolidate his position within the
fractious Maronite community. On June 13, 1978, he launched a
surprise attack that decimated the Marada Brigade, the pro-Syrian
Christian Militia led by Tony Franjiyah (son of the former
president), who was killed in the attach, and provoked the
Syrians with direct attacks. In pitting his meager force of a few
thousand fighters against three divisions of the Syrian Army,
Jumayyil was taking a calculated gamble that Israel would come to
his rescue and evict the Syrians. Syria rushed forces to Beirut
and unleashed a devastating artillery attack on East Beirut,
particularly the Phalangist stronghold of Al Ashrafiyah, in
preparation for taking over the area. But Jumayyil's brinkmanship
was vindicated. The IDF massed forces on the Golan Heights and
threatened to go to war to preserve the Maronite community. To
emphasize the point,
Israeli jets overflew Syrian positions. The threat worked, and
Syria withdrew its troops.
Once again, Jumayyil took the opportunity to strengthen his grip
over the Maronites. On July 7, 1980, the Phalangists launched
another surprise attack, wiping out Shamun's Militia, the Tigers.
Through this process of elimination, Jumayyil emerged as the
dominant Maronite military leader.
Jumayyil persevered in his plot to embroil Israel in a full scale
war with Syria. In late 1980.
In April 1981, Jumayyil decided to put Israel's promise to the
test. Syria had launched its "Program of National
Reconciliation," which was designed to install Sulayman
Franjiyah as president. Jumayyil found the proposition
unpalatable, but he was impotent to oppose it politically.
Therefore, he staged an incident in the city of Zahlah
deliberately calculated to flare
into a major crisis. Zahlah, the capital of Al Biqa Province in
eastern Lebanon, had never been a Phalangist base; its population
was primarily proSyrian Greek Orthodox, and it was about fifteen
kilometers west of the Syrian border in the heart of the
Syrian-occupied zone of Lebanon. Jumayyil infiltrated
approximately 100 Phalangist militiamen into the city to attack
Syrian positions and to shell the Syrian headquarters in the
adjacent town of Shtawrah. The Syrians responded by besieging
Zahlah. Jumayyil then called an urgent meeting with Begin and
convinced him that the Syrians intended to follow through on the
siege with an all-out attack on the Christian heartland. Although
Syrian president Hafiz al Assad had told Jumayyil he would lift
the siege if the Phalangists evacuated the city, Jumayyil
concealed this point from Begin and instead urged Israel to honor
its promise and launch an air strike against the Syrians.
On April 28, the Israeli cabinet convened and authorized a
limited air strike, but it did so over the strident objections of
Israel's intelligence chiefs, who suspected that the crisis was a
Phalangist ploy. Israeli fighters carried out the raid and downed
two Syrian helicopter troop transports on Jabal Sannin, a
strategic mountain overlooking Zahlah.
The Israeli attack caught the
Syrians by surprise. Syria had adhered to the so-called "Red
Line" agreements by deliberately refraining from deploying
antiaircraft missiles in the Biqa Valley and by not impeding
Israeli photoreconnaissance overflights. Assad responded to the
Israeli attack by stationing SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
in the vicinity of Zahlah. Other SAMs
and surface-to-surface missiles were deployed on the Syrian side
of the border. Begin vowed publicly that the IDF would launch an
attack on the missiles. In response, President Ronald Reagan
dispatched to the Middle East Special Ambassador Philip Habib,
who averted the imminent Israeli strike. Meanwhile, the
Phalangists abandoned Zahlah, and Syria reasserted its control
over the Biqa Valley. The net effect of the crisis was that
Syrian air defense missiles were deployed in Lebanon. Israel was
forced to tolerate this situation in the short run, but it still
regarded the missile deployment as an unacceptable shift in the
balance of forces that could not be endured indefinitely.
Therefore, Israel had reasons of its own for a future attack on
the Syrians in Lebanon.
As the tension in the Biqa Valley
subsided, IDF chief of staff Rafael Eitan urged Begin to mount an
artillery bombardment of Palestinian bases in Lebanon. Israel
routinely conducted preemptive artillery attacks and air strikes
to deter PLO terrorist attacks against Galilee settlements in
northern Israel. Then, on July 10, 1981, the IDF commenced five
days of air strikes and naval bombardments against PLO
strongholds in southern Lebanon.
The PLO fought back by shelling the Israeli resort town of
Nahariyya on the Mediterranean coast. The conflict escalated as
Israel launched a devastating air raid against the heavily
populated Palestinian neighborhood of Fakhani in West Beirut,
killing over 100 people and wounding over 600. By Israeli
estimates, only thirty of those killed were terrorists. For ten
days, the PLO then unleashed artillery fire against the upper
Galilee. Although only six Israeli citizens were killed, many
Israelis were shocked and stunned by the PLO's capability to
sustain such an attack.
On July 24, Ambassador Habib returned to Israel to negotiate an
end to the artillery duel. Because the PLO was almost out of
ammunition and most of its guns had been silenced, the IDF wanted
to prolong the fighting until it could win a clear-cut victory.
But the Israeli cabinet was eager to comply with Habib's
cease-fire proposal, and Israel entered into a truce with the
PLO.
PLO leader Yasir Arafat was determined not to break the ceasefire
. On a political level, the truce enhanced the PLO's diplomatic
credibility. Tactically, it allowed the PLO time to reinforce its
military strength in southern Lebanon. The Soviet Union refused
to provide the PLO with weapons, but PLO emissaries purchased
arms from East European countries and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), acquiring
Grad and Katyusha artillery rockets and antiquated but functional
T-34 tanks.
On June 4, IDF aircraft bombed Palestinian targets in West
Beirut, and the PLO resumed artillery fire on Israeli settlements
in the northern Galilee.
The Israeli cabinet convened and voted to authorize an invasion,
named Operation Peace for Galilee, but it set strict limits on
the extent of the incursion. The IDF was to advance no farther
than forty kilometers, the operation was to last only twenty-four
hours, Syrian forces were not to be attacked, and Beirut was not
to be approached.
Beirut Under Seige
The cease-fire signaled the start
of a new stage in the war, as Israel focused on PLO forces
trapped in Beirut. Although Israel had long adhered to the axiom
that conquering and occupying an Arab capital would be a
political and military disaster, key Israeli leaders were
determined to drive the PLO out of Beirut. According to the
original plan, the Phalangists were to move
into West Beirut under the covering fire of Israeli artillery and
reunite the divided capital. Bashir Jumayyil concluded, however,
that such overt collusion with the IDF would prejudice his
chances to become president, and he reneged on the promises he
had made.
Israel maintained the siege of Beirut for seventy days,
unleashing a relentless barrage of air, naval, and artillery
bombardment. At times, the Israeli bombardment appeared to be
random and indiscriminate; at other times, it was targeted with
pinpoint precision. Then, the Israeli Air Force conducted what
has been called a "manhunt by air" for Arafat and his
top lieutenants and on several occasions bombed premises only
minutes after the PLO leadership had vacated them.
If the PLO was hurt physically by the bombardment, the political
fallout was just as damaging to Israel. The appalling civilian
casualties earned Israel world opprobrium. Morale plummeted among
IDF officers and enlisted men, many of whom personally opposed
the war. Meanwhile, the highly publicized plight of the
Palestinian civilians garnered world attention for the
Palestinian cause. Furthermore, Arafat was negotiating, albeit
through intermediaries, with Ambassador Habib and other United
States officials. Negotiating with Arafat was thought by some to
be tantamount to United States recognition of the PLO.
Arafat had threatened to turn Beirut into a "second
Stalingrad," to fight the IDF to the last man. His
negotiating stance grew tenuous, however, after Lebanese leaders,
who had previously expressed solidarity with the PLO, petitioned
him to abandon Beirut to spare the civilian population further
suffering. Arafat informed Habib of his agreement in principle to
withdraw the PLO from Beirut on condition that a multinational
peacekeeping force be deployed to protect the Palestinian
families left behind. With the diplomatic deadlock broken, Habib
made a second breakthrough when Syria and Tunisia agreed to host
departing PLO fighters. An advance unit of the Multinational
Force (MNF), 350 French troops, arrived in Beirut on August
21. The Palestinian evacuation by sea to Cyprus and by land to
Damascus commenced on the same day. On August 26, the remaining
MNF troops arrived in Beirut, including a contingent of 800
United States Marines. The Palestinian exodus ended on September
1. Approximately 8,000 Palestinian guerrillas, 2,600 PLA
regulars, and 3,600 Syrian troops had been
evacuated from West Beirut.
Lebanese estimates, compiled from International Red Cross sources
and police and hospital
surveys, calculated that 17,825 Lebanese had died and over 30,000
had been wounded.
On August 23, the legislature elected Bashir Jumayyil president
of Lebanon. On September 10, the United States Marines withdrew
from Beirut, followed by the other members of the MNF. The
Lebanese Army began to move into West Beirut, and the Israelis
withdrew their troops from the front lines. But the war was far
from over. By ushering in Jumayyil as president and
evicting the PLO from Beirut, Israel had attained two of its key
war goals. Israel's remaining ambition was to sign a
comprehensive peace treaty with Lebanon that would entail the
withdrawal of Syrian forces and prevent the PLO from
reinfiltrating Lebanon after the IDF withdrew.
Jumayyil repudiated earlier promises to Israel immediately after
the election. He informed the Israelis that a peace treaty was
inconceivable as long as the IDF or any other foreign forces
remained in Lebanon and that it could be concluded only with the
consent of all the Lebanese.
But on September 14, 1982, President-elect Jumayyil was
assassinated in a massive radio-detonated explosion that leveled
the Phalange Party headquarters where he was delivering a speech
to party members. The perpetrator, Habib Shartuni, was soon
apprehended. Shartuni, a member of the Syrian Socialist
Nationalist Party, was allegedly a Syrian agent. Jumayyil's
brother, Amin, who was hostile to the Israeli presence in
Lebanon, was elected president with United States backing.
On the evening of September 16, 1982, the IDF, having surrounded
the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, dispatched
approximately 300 to 400 Christian militiamen into the camps to
rout what was believed to be the remnant of the Palestinian
forces. The militiamen were mostly Phalangists under the command
of Elie Hubayka , a former close aide of Bashir Jumayyil, but
militiamen from the Israeli-supported SLA were also present. The
IDF ordered its soldiers to refrain from entering the camps, but
IDF officers supervised the operation from the roof of a
six-story building overlooking parts of the area. According to
the report of the Kahan Commission established by the government
of Israel to investigate the events, the IDF monitored the
Phalangist radio network and fired illumination flares from
mortars and aircraft to light the area. Over a period of two
days, the Christian militiamen killed some 700 to 800 Palestinian
men, women, and children.
The Multinational Force
At the behest of the Lebanese
government, the Multinational Force (MNF) was deployed again in
Beirut, but with over twice the manpower of the first
peacekeeping force. It was designated MNF II and given the
mandate to serve as an "interpositional force,"
separating the IDF from the Lebanese population. Additionally,
MNF II was assigned the task of assisting the Lebanese Army in
restoring the authority of the central government over Beirut.
The United States dispatched a contingent of 1,400 men, France
1,500, and Italy 1,400. A relatively small British contingent of
about 100 men was added in January 1983, at which time the
Italian contingent was increased to 2,200 men. Each contingent
retained its own command structure, and no central command
structure was created. The French contingent was assigned
responsibility for the port area and West Beirut.
The Italian contingent occupied the area between West Beirut and
Beirut International Airport, which encompassed the Sabra and
Shatila refugee camps. The 32d United States Marines Amphibious
Unit returned to Beirut on September 29, where it took up
positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport. The
Marines' positions were adjacent to the IDF front lines.
The Marines' stated mission was to establish an environment that
permit the Lebanese Army to carry out its responsibilities in the
Beirut area. Tactically, the Marines were charged with occupying
and securing positions along a line from the airport east to the
Presidential Palace at Babda. The intent was to separate the IDF
from the population of Beirut.
The key to the initial success of MNF II was its neutrality. The
Lebanese government had assured Ambassador Habib in writing that
it had obtained commitments from various factions to refrain from
hostilities against the Marines. The United States reputation
among the Lebanese was enhanced when a Marine officer was obliged
to draw his pistol to halt an Israeli advance, an event
sensationalized in the news media. And, in the same month,
Marines conducted emergency relief operations in the mountains
after a midwinter blizzard.
At this juncture, the prevalent mood in Lebanon was one of
cautious optimism and hope. The Lebanese Army was pressed into
service to clear away the rubble of years of warfare. The
government approved a US$600 million reconstruction plan. On
October 1, President Jumayyil declared Beirut reunited, as the
army demolished barricades along the Green Line that had been
standing since 1975. Hundreds of criminals and gang leaders were
rounded up and arrested. In the first months of 1983,
approximately 5,000 government troops were deployed throughout
Greater Beirut. Most important, the government began to build a
strong national army, Lebanese optimism was bolstered by changing
Israeli politics and policies. Accordingly, Israel withdrew its
forces to the outskirts of the capital. But the IDF had no clear
tactical mission in Lebanon. Its continued presence was intended
as a bargaining chip in negotiations for a Syrian withdrawal.
While awaiting the political agreement, the IDF was forced to
fight a different kind of war, which Israeli newspapers compared
with the Vietnam War. The IDF had been turned into a static and
defensive garrison force like the Syrians before them, caught in
the cross fire between warring factions. When Phalangist forces
tried to exploit the fluid situation by attacking the Druze
militia in the Shuf Mountains in late 1983, the IDF had to
intervene and separate the forces. In southern Lebanon, the IDF
had to protect the many Palestinian refugees who had streamed
back to the camps against attacks by Israel's proxy force, the
SLA. In one of the bigger ironies of the war, the IDF recruited
and armed Palestinian home guards to prevent a repetition of the
massacres in Beirut.
May 17 Agreement
In April 1983, an attack destroyed
the United States embassy, and the ambassador moved diplomatic
operations to his official residence. The United States
persevered in its efforts to broker an Israeli-Lebanese
agreement, and Israel announced its willingness to negotiate.
Although Israel had envisaged a treaty like the Camp David
Agreements with Egypt, entailing full bilateral diplomatic
recognition, it settled for mere "normalization." The
military and security articles of the May 17 Agreement between
the Israeli and Lebanese governments called for an abolition of
the state of war between the two countries, security arrangements
to ensure the sanctity of Israel's northern border, integration
of Major Haddad's SLA into the regular Lebanese Army, and Israeli
withdrawal.
The Israeli withdrawal was made contingent upon concurrent Syrian
withdrawal, however. The United States had decided not to seek
Syrian participation in the negotiations for the May 17 Agreement
for fear of becoming entangled in the overall Syrian-Israeli
imbroglio. Instead, the United States intended to seek Syrian
endorsement after the agreement was signed. But
Syria opposed the agreement, and because implementation hinged on
Syrian withdrawal, Damascus could exert veto power. Although
President Jumayyil made conciliatory overtures to Damascus, he
also notified the Arab League on June 4 that the ADF was no
longer in existence.
Syria responded by announcing on July 23, 1983, the foundation of
the National Salvation Front (NSF). This coalition comprised many
sects, including the Druzes led by Walid Jumblatt; Shias led by
Nabih Birri ; Sunni Muslims led by Rashid Karami; Christian
elements led by Sulayman Franjiyah; and several smaller,
Syrian-sponsored, left-wing political parties. These groups,
together with Syria, controlled much more of Lebanon's territory
than did the central government. Therefore, the NSF constituted a
challenge not only to Jumayyil but also to his patrons, the
United States and Israel. To emphasize their opposition to the
May 17 Agreement, Syrian and Druze forces in the mountains above
the capital loosed a barrage of artillery fire on Christian areas
of Beirut, underscoring the weakness of Jumayyil's government.
By mid-1983 the mood of optimism that had flourished at the end
of 1982 had disappeared. It became clear that the tentative
alliance of Lebanon's rival factions was merely a function of
their shared opposition to a common enemy, Israel. Terrorist
activity resumed, and between June and August 1983, at least
twenty car bombs exploded throughout Lebanon, killing over
seventy people. Lebanon's prime minister narrowly escaped death
in one explosion. Targets included a mosque in Tripoli; a
television station, hospital, and luxury hotel in Beirut; and a
market in Baalbek.
The May 17 Agreement had significant implications for the MNF. As
a noncombatant interpositional force preventing the IDF from
entering Beirut, the MNF had been perceived by the Muslims in
West Beirut as a protector. As the Israeli withdrawal neared,
however, the MNF came to be regarded as a protagonist in the
unfinished Civil War, propping up the Jumayyil government. In
August militiamen began to bombard United States Marines
positions near Beirut International Airport with mortar and
rocket fire as the Lebanese Army fought Druze and Shia forces in
the southern suburbs of Beirut. On August 29, 1983, two Marines
were killed and fourteen wounded, and in the ensuing months the
Marines came under almost daily attack from artillery, mortar,
rocket, and small-arms fire.
The Mountain War
On September 3, 1983, the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) began to evacuate the Shuf Mountains region
and within twenty-four hours had completed its redeployment to
south of the Awwali River. In the power vacuum resulting from the
Israeli withdrawal, the Phalangist militia, no longer under
Jumayyil's firm control, clashed with the Druze militia at
Bhamdun, a town located where the Beirut-Damascus highway touches
the edge of the Shuf Mountains. Simultaneously, the Lebanese Army
sought to guard the cities of Suq al Gharb and Khaldah to prevent
Druze forces from invading Beirut.
After several days of combat, the Phalangist militia was routed
at Bhamdun and retreated to its stronghold of Dayr al Qamar,
along with much of the Christian population. The Druzes
surrounded and besieged Dayr al Qamar, which held 40,000
Christian residents and refugees and 2,000 Phalangist fighters.
In other areas of the Shuf Mountains, the Druzes went on a
rampage reminiscent of the 1860 massacres. The Catholic
Information Center in Beirut reported that 1,500 Christian
civilians were killed and 62 Christian villages demolished. The
defeat of the Phalangists was expensive for the Christian
community, which lost a large amount of territory.
The cost in political currency was even higher, however. Not only
did the fighting deal a blow to Amin Jumayyil's credibility and
authority in his dual role as chief of state and leader of the
Christian community, it destroyed the myth shared by many
different Lebanese factions that the Lebanese Civil War had been
settled in 1976. Admittedly, Christians and Muslims had continued
to fire on each other's neighborhoods on occasion, but this was
perceived as part of Lebanon's environment, like the weather. In
all the significant fighting between 1976 and 1982, the Syrians,
Israelis, and Palestinians had been belligerents on either or
both sides of the conflict. The Mountain War, as the 1983-84
fighting in the Shuf Mountains came to be called, however, was a
purely Lebanese contest, and it dashed the hopes harbored by many
that the withdrawal of foreign forces would end the Civil War. In
Suq al Gharb and Khaldah, it was the Lebanese Army rather than
the Phalangists that confronted the Druze militias. On September
16, 1983, Druze forces massed on the threshold of Suq al Gharb.
For the next three days the army's Eighth Brigade fought
desperately to retain control of the town . The tiny Lebanese Air
Force was thrown into the fray, losing several aircraft to Druze
missile fire. United States Navy warships shelled Druze positions
and helped the Lebanese Army hold the town until a cease-fire was
declared on September 25, on which day the battleship U.S.S. New
Jersey arrived on the scene.
The Multinational Forces Withdrawal
Although the Lebanese Army had beaten the Druze
forces on the battlefield, it was a Pyrrhic victory because the
army was discredited if not defeated. Approximately 900 Druze
enlisted men and 60 officers defected from the army to join their
coreligionists. The Lebanese Armed Forces chief of staff, General
Nadim al Hakim, fled into Druze territory, but he would not
admit he had actually defected. Thus, the army again had split
along confessional lines. Furthermore, the army had halted the
Druzes only with United States armed intervention.
For its part, the United States had clearly inherited Israel's
role of shoring up the precarious Lebanese government. On
September 29, 1983, the United States Congress, by a solid
majority, adopted a resolution declaring the 1973 War Powers
Resolution to apply to the situation in Lebanon and sanctioned
the United States military presence for an eighteen-month period.
Although the MNF remained in Lebanon after the October 1983
suicide truck bombings (where more than 250 US Marines were
killed) , the situation of the United States and French
contingents was precarious . In early February 1984, Shia Amal
militiamen clashed with the Lebanese Army in the southern suburbs
of Beirut and after four days of heavy fighting gained control
over Beirut
International Airport, evicted the army from West Beirut, and
reestablished the Green Line partitioning the capital. The
decisive defeat of the army on two key fronts led to its gradual
disintegration, as demoralized soldiers defected to join the
opposition. United States Marines stationed near Beirut
International Airport were surrounded by predominantly Shia
militia groups. As the security environment in Lebanon
deteriorated, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States
decided to withdraw their MNF contingents.
The Bickfaya Accord
The withdrawal of the MNF left Syria as the
dominant force in Lebanon, and Syria acted rapidly to consolidate
its grip on Lebanese affairs. It pressured Jumayyil to abrogate
the May 17 Agreement, and he did so on March 6, 1985. This event
led to the resignation of the Council of Ministers and its
replacement by a new government of national unity headed by
Rashid
Karami.
Syria hammered out yet another security accord, the Bikfayya
Agreement of June 18. Muslim and Druze cabinet ministers had
insisted on the creation of a military command council to replace
the post of commander in chief of the armed forces, a proposal
that was opposed by Christian cabinet ministers, who perceived it
as a dilution of their control over the military. A compromise
was reached providing for the continuation of the post of
commander in chief, to be held by a Maronite as before, but also
the establishment of a multiconfessional six-man military command
council to have authority over appointments at the brigade and
division levels . Major General Ibrahim Tannus, the army
commander, was replaced by Major General Michel Awn (also seen as
Aoun), who was somewhat more acceptable to Muslims. Nevertheless,
the Maronite-commanded military intelligence apparatus remained
intact as a separate but parallel institution. The agreement also
called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy artillery and
militiamen from the streets of East Beirut and West Beirut, the
dismantling of barricades along the Green Line, and the reopening
of the airport and port. The agreement formally took effect on
June 23 and was implemented by July 6, 1985.
Optimistic predictions that the Bikfayya Agreement would end
Lebanon's chronic conflict were dashed as sporadic battles and
terrorist attacks resumed. The accord was criticized vehemently
by elements among the Maronites as Druze, Shia, and Sunni militia
fought one another in West Beirut. Armed Shias stormed and burned
the Saudi Arabian embassy on August 24. On September 20, in a
replay of the April 1983 attack, a suicide vehicle bomber
attacked the new United States embassy building in East Beirut,
killing eight and wounding dozens. The mounting tension in
Lebanon was exacerbated by Israeli air raids against Palestinian
guerrilla camps of the Abu Musa faction. The Bikfayya Agreement
suffered another blow on August 23, when General al Hakim, the
newly appointed Druze chief of staff of the Lebanese Armed
Forces, died in an accidental helicopter crash. And, on August 30
Maronite patriarch and Phalange Party founder Pierre Jumayyil
died of a heart attack, setting the stage for a power struggle in
the Christian community.
Syria, determined to implement the security plans it had
sponsored, attempted to restore order. It curbed the activities
of the Iranian Pasdaran and Hizballah in Baalbek in the Biqa
Valley, and it quelled the fierce fighting in the northern port
city of Tripoli.
The Rise of the Lebanese Army
The Bickfaya
Accord like its predecessors is down the drain and another hope
for the Lebanese people is gone. In the mean time General Michel
Aoun (head of the Lebanese Army) gained popularity and support of
whatever left from the his Army. When the term of president Amin
Jumayyel ended, the country was in total chaos and could not hold
new elections. President Jumayyel had no choice but leaving the
presidential palace and giving all power to General Michel Aoun.
General Aoun was the only authority at that time. General Michel
Aoun formed a ministry with Christian influence and was known to
be the Christians government. As an oppoition the muslims had
their own government and the country was divided into two
governments fighting for power and International acceptance.
Michel Aoun with absolute power over the Army shopped for weapons
and military assisstance from other countries like Iraq which
provided him with full support and the Lebanese Army gained power
after power.
East-Beirut Under Siege
In March 14, 1989 , General Michel Aoun started the Liberation War against all invaders (mainly Syria) by shelling West-Beirut during rush hour at 9:00AM. People were caught under fire and killed on spot in their cars. Lebanese People gathered around radios to know more about this new kind of war and soon the ghost of war appeared collecting innocent civilians and trapping people under ground while schools and universities shut their doors, banks and institutes closed down and a cloud of gun powder and fire covered Beirut. The Liberation War Led by General Aoun was directed against Syria and its allies. The muslim leftist parties were involved in this war and backed up by Syrian heavy fire arms. The shelling was continuous 24 hours. The smell of death and powder were all over the country. It was obvious since day one of the Liberation war that the dream of Michel Aoun was impossible in front of the Syrian powers in Lebanon, then East-Beirut along with all the Christian Sectors were under Siege by the Syrian forces and its Lebanese supporters. This Siege was somehow more brutal that the Israeli Seige of West-Beirut. The Seige was from Air, Land and Sea. No one can enter or leave. No water, electricity and food were allowed. 24 hours of deadly battles everywhere. So many cease-fire were broken. Mediators failed to stop the Ambition of General Michel Aoun. The Lebanese Army started to loose power and ammunition day by day.
Taef Agreement
More than 3000 people were killed and the country
collapsed along with its Army. At this point General Aoun agreed
to find a solution out of this deadly war and all forces were
invited to Taef (Saudi Arabia) to work on an agreement that ends
this crazy war. On October 22 1989 the Lebanese National Assembly
meeting in Taif Saudi Arabia endorsed an accord for national
reconciliation. The Taif accord restructured the political system
in Lebanon by transferring power away from the traditionally
Maronite presidency to a Cabinet divided equally between Muslims
and Christians.
The accord was rejected by General Michel Aoun but was accepted
by other Maronite leaders. While Syria voiced support for the
accord some Syrian-backed militia leaders such as
Walid Jumblatt and Nabi Berri expressed disappointment over the
accord which they considered superficial and overly favorable to
the Sunni Muslim minority. The outcome of the Taef Agreement was
considered positive and a new hope for the Lebanese people.
Politicians agreed on new basis to work together to end the war.
And Michel Aoun, still popular among his soldiers, was given time
to figure out his position in the new agreement.
Inter-Christian War
During the Liberation war other Christian leaders criticized General Aoun for his leadership and called him crazy and insane. His plan of repelling the Syrian army failed drastically and found himself fighting other Lebanese parties. At this time the opposition grew strong led by Samir Jaa'jaa , leader of the Lebanese Forces, and the popularity of General Aounn started to disappear and the old time hero now is an all time wanted criminal. To stop these accusations General Michel Aoun conducted his own war against the opposition christian leaders mainly Samir Jaa'jaa the leader of the Lebanese forces, and the internal Christian war started and was known as the Cancellation War ( Michel Aoun wanted to put down and cancel the Lebanese forces the only equal forces that threatens his power). This deathfull war was never seen in all the 17 years of the Lebanese civil war. Solders killed each others from house to house. Tanks clashed in the streets. It was pictured as the war of two brothers living in the same house. Death was a daily news. Fearful fighting was everywhere in the Christian sector. Two major most strong forces in Lebanon ( the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese forces) clashed together and death was the only way out. This war demolished the christian stronghold and basically destroyed all Christian representations in Lebanon. The two Christians forces clashed to death. Soldiers were exhausted and had no more ammunition and corpses lied down in the streets for weeks till the red cross has the opportunity to retrieve them. This war led to a total destruction of the Christian forces and lands. In the mean time the muslims-leftist and the Syrians started to ignite the war whenever they can between the two Christian parties by supplying arms and ammunition for both parties to continue fighting. After total destruction of East-Beirut and all Christians stronghold, the christian leaders along with their forces found themselves helpless.
The End of the War
Due to the severity of the situation the international community asked again the Syrian Army to take action and stop the fighting. After almost two years, the Syrian Army marched down without any significant resistance and captured the presidential palace while Michel Aoun fled to the French Embassy then the Syrian Forces took control over all the Christian territories without any resisitance. The two years war ended in two hours and by the end of the day , the Syrian Army gained absolute control over all christian sector.
And that was
the last battle in the 17 years war ,
1975-1992...With No Winners But All Losers ...
~End of Conflict~
Since
the end of Lebanon's devastating civil war in October 1992, the
country has established a more fair political system, and Lebanon
has held its first legislative election in 20 years,
Due to the graphic nature of
war pictures, no pictures were inserted in this page.
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